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NOTES
INTERCIRCUIT DEFERENCE IN
DIVERSITY CASES: RESPECT FOR
EXPERTISE OR JUDICIAL
VENTRILOQUISM?t
The stranger from afar, unacquainted with the local ways, per-
mits himself to be guided by the best evidence available, the di-
rections or the counsel of those who dwell upon the spot.
-Benjamin N. Cardozott
Federal courts often have recognized that under certain cir-
cumstances, another legal authority is better equipped to render a
decision based upon the applicable law. In these instances, courts
have employed a policy of judicial deference which allows a court
to adopt the decisions of an authority more knowledgeable in the
particular area of the law at issue.1 The Supreme Court and the
circuit courts of appeals, for example, have deferred to a district
court's interpretation of local state law for the state in which the
district court sits.2 Similarly, when one circuit court of appeals has
t Subsequent to the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which
required a federal court to apply state law in diversity cases, id. at 78; see infra note 15 and
accompanying text, Judge Frank, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, characterized the
role of the federal courts as that of a "ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of [a] particular
state," Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
it Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 60 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (espousing the need for federal
courts in diversity cases to follow local state law).
' See, e.g., Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980).
Deference is defined as a "yielding of judgment or preference out of respect for the position,
wish, or known opinion of another." WEnsTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 591
(P. Gove ed. 1976). A court that defers is necessarily influenced by the other court's position
or opinion and because deference is motivated by respect, that position or opinion is viewed
as a higher authority on the particular matter. It is submitted, therefore, that judicial defer-
ence can be summarized as a yielding of judgment to a higher authority.
2 See City of Burbank v. Nevada, 658 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1981); Tomlin v. Boeing
Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981); Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d
314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980); Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345, 347 (9th Cir.
1974); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956) (interpretation of
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interpreted a federal statute, a sister circuit may defer to that in-
terpretation.3 Several circuits, recognized as experts in a particular
area of law, may also function as authoritative sources to which a
sister circuit can turn for guidance.4 Additionally, federal courts
local law by local district court is given special weight); Steele v. General Mills, Inc., 329
U.S. 433, 439 (1947) (district court's interpretation of purely local law left undisturbed);
Bazzano v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir. 1978) (special weight given to a
trial judge's interpretation of state law in diversity cases); Eason v. Weaver, 557 F.2d 1202,
1206 (5th Cir. 1977) (substantial weight afforded to the district court's assessment of local
law); Symons v. Mueller Co., 493 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1974) (district court's interpreta-
tion is presumed to be correct).
3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been a frequent proponent of according def-
erence to the decisions of sister circuits. E.g., National Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. EPA,
566 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1977); Cosentino v. Local 28, Org. of Masters, 268 F.2d 648, 652
(8th Cir. 1959). In expounding the need for judicial deference to the statutory interpreta-
tions of sister circuits, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Although we are not bound by another circuit's decision, we adhere to the policy
that a sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves great weight and precedential
value. As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among
the circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary bur-
dens on the Supreme Court's docket. Unless our. . . courts of appeals are thus
willing to promote a cohesive network of national law, needless division and con-
fusion will encourage further splintering and the formation of otherwise unneces-
sary additional tiers in the framework of our national court system.
Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has commented that "on an unsettled question of federal
law, while a decision by another court of appeals is not compulsively binding upon us, we
will, in the interest of judicial uniformity, accept it as persuasive and follow it, unless we are
clearly convinced that it is wrong." Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 773 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 866 (1960). Such a policy of deference is not, however, limited to the
Eighth Circuit. See, e.g., Federal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th
Cir. 1975) (decisions of other circuits should be followed unless incorrect); Warren Bros. Co.
v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (1st Cir. 1973) (application of the reasoning of other
circuits on the question presented); Andrew v. Bendix Corp., 452 F.2d 961, 963 (6th Cir.
1971) (decision of a sister circuit used for guidance), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
4 A circuit attains a reputation as an "expert" in a particular area of the law through its
"wide and varied experience in the application of the rules of law governing a certain gen-
eral subject." H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 24, at 82 (1912).
For example, the Second Circuit is typically viewed as an expert in securities law, while the
District of Columbia Circuit has achieved expert status in communications laws. Note, Se-
curing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of
Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219, 1239 n.138 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Securing Uni-
formity in National Law]. Even if a circuit court of appeals cannot be deemed "expert,"
certain circuits are nevertheless perceived to be of a higher quality than others. Goldman,
Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, in AMERICAN JUDICIAL BE-
HAVIOR 105 (S. Brenner ed. 1973); Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law, supra, at
1239. This perception of quality is normally a result of the perceived strengths or weak-
nesses of the judges in the circuit, see H. BLACK, supra §§ 38-39, at 112-16; cf. Sprecher, The
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should be Ap-
plied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 506 & n.69 (1945) (strong judges add to the quality of the prece-
dent), and it is often an important factor in deciding whether to defer to the decision of the
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often afford deference to the decisions of administrative agencies.5
Regardless of the circumstances creating the potential for ju-
dicial deference, the determinative factor in deciding whether to
defer is the authority of the court to which deference is being
paid. An inquiry into the extent of a court's authority must begin
with the Constitution and federal legislation, which delineate the
hierarchy of the federal court system. A problem arises, however,
sister circuit, Goldman, supra, at 105; Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law, supra,
at 1239.
5 See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (FCC's judgment
on how to best serve the public interest is entitled to substantial judicial deference); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560 (1980) (deferring to a regulation promul-
gated by the Federal Reserve Board under the Truth in Lending Act); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (deferring to the Secretary of the Interior's construction of an executive
order pertaining to federal lands); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961) (deference afforded the decision of the Atomic Energy
Commission rendered pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act). Deference to an agency decision
has been justified on the basis of courts' lack of power to "substitute [their] judgment for
that of the agency." FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 803
(1978) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). Fur-
ther, a court typically predicates its decision to defer on the expertise of the particular
agency. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-95 (1981); American Trucking
Ass'n v. United States, 642 F.2d 916, 920 (5th Cir. 1981).
It is submitted, however, that judicial reliance on the expertise of an administrative
agency often may be displaced. For instance, the seven Commissioners of the FCC, who are
responsible for effective application of the Communications Act, are political appointees.
They come from varied backgrounds and there is no requirement that they be familiar with,
the communications industry prior to their appointment. E. KEASNOW & L. LONGLEY, THE
PoLrrmcs oF BROADCAST REGULATION 27-38 (2d ed. 1978). Much of the technical expertise
necessary to render complex decisions is provided by agency staff personnel. Id. at 28-30.
When the Commissioners must choose between competing policies, they often rely solely on
information presented by staff members. Id. The resulting policy, viewed by a deferring
court as based on the expertise of the Commission, in reality may be a product of numerous
outside influences.
In the final analysis, however, courts regard the agency as a higher authority on matters
within the scope of its authority because the agency possesses greater familiarity with its
own operations and enabling statute. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965);
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)
(quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)); Mc-
Laren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921); Columbia Gas Dev. Corp. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 651 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
" Cf. H. BLACK, supra note 4, §§ 38-39, at 112-16 (value of a prior decision as a prece-
dent depends upon the rank of the court that rendered the decision).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court as the
highest judicial authority, providing that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.. . ." Id. Pursuant to its power to create inferior courts, Con-
gress enacted the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, which created an intermediate court of ap-
peals below the Supreme Court. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826
(1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1976)). For a discussion of the history of
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when a court defers to the judgment of another court of equal or
lower authority. In this situation, there is no constitutional or stat-
utory requirement that deference be accorded the decision of the
coordinate or lower judicial authority." Since deference involves a
yielding of judgment to a higher authority,9 it is therefore sug-
gested that the court of coordinate or lower authority in fact, is
perceived by the deferring court as a "higher authority" in theory.
Thus, theoretical criteria for characterizing a court as a "higher au-
thority" must be isolated.
Within the limited context of diversity jurisdiction, this Note
will examine the factors that qualify one court of appeals as a
higher authority, worthy of deference by another, on unsettled
questions of state law. In this respect, the implications of the re-
cent case of Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,'0 will be discussed.
In light of the Factors decision, the Note proposes a series of in-
quiries to be considered by a court in determining whether to defer
to the decision of a coordinate authority. A number of hypothetical
problem areas are examined using these inquiries in an effort to
determine their effectiveness in guiding the court to a correct deci-
sion. Finally, the Note applies the suggested inquiries to the Fac-
this act, see Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law, supra note 4, at 1232-36.
9 See Bazzano v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir. 1978) (circuit court
gives special weight to decision of district court but is not bound by it); United States v.
Dawson, 576 F.2d 656, 659 (5th Cir. 1978) (circuit court of appeals is not bound by the
decisions of other circuits), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979); United States v. Northside
Realty Assocs., 518 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1975) (court of appeals is bound only by decisions
of the circuit and the Supreme Court), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). It is the doctrine of
stare decisis that provides the foundation for a court's adherence to its own previous deci-
sions or those of a higher legal authority. See Kelnan, The Force of Precedent in the Lower
Courts, 14 WA=NE L. REv. 3, 3-4 (1967); Re, Stare Decisis and the Judicial Process, 22
CATH. LAW. 38, 38 (1976). Stare decisis has several important functions, including "fostering
stability and permitting the development of a consistent and coherent body of law." Id.
However, the doctrine of stare decisis has a number of practical limitations which have the
effect of not requiring adherence to past precedents under all circumstances. For instance,
the decisions of federal courts have no binding effect upon other courts of superior or coor-
dinate authority. See Sprecher, supra note 4, at 503. Moreover, pursuant to stare decisis,
the decisions of a federal court only have binding precedential value when they are rendered
by a superior court to which an inferior court owes a duty of obedience. See Kelman, supra,
at 4; Sprecher, supra note 4, at 503. Thus, within the context of the federal court system,
stare decisis requires that all circuit courts of appeals and all district courts adhere to deci-
sions of the Supreme Court on the same question. Sprecher, supra note 4, at 503. Further-
more, a federal court of appeals renders binding precedent for the district courts within its
circuit but not for those of another circuit. Id. at 503 & n.35. Finally, a federal court is not
required to follow decisions rendered by courts of coordinate or inferior authority. Id.
9 See supra note 1.
10 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982).
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tors case and concludes that the Second Circuit's deference to a
prior decision of the Sixth Circuit was unwarranted.
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN DIVERSITY CASES
The task of determining the proper law to be applied in diver-
sity cases has long been of significant concern to the federal courts.
While the federal judiciary typically has been required to apply
state law in diversity actions," "state law" as initially interpreted
included only state statutory authority.12 Thus, in the absence of
an applicable state statute, federal courts decided issues of state
law without reference to the decisional law of the state. 3
In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 4 the Supreme Court reacted
against the disparity of this "general law" emanating from the fed-
eral bench on a case-by-case basis, and determined that the law to
be applied in diversity cases is the state law as declared by statute
" See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54, at 249-53 (3d ed. 1976). The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." Judici-
ary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976))
(also known as the Rules of Decision Act).
11 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the decisions of state courts were "at most, only evidence of what the laws are;
and [were] not of themselves laws." Id. at 18. The Court reasoned that the "laws" of the
states, within the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act, see supra note 11, were the rules
and enactments promulgated by the state legislature. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. As such, the
Court concluded that while the decisions of the state courts will be considered by the fed-
eral courts, they are not controlling. Id. at 19. Therefore, in the absence of a controlling
state statute, the federal courts were free to fashion their own opinion of the true result. Id.;
C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 54, at 249-50.
" The federal courts' approach of rendering case-by-case decisions regarding state law,
without reference to existing state decisional law, led to the creation of a federal general
common law. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (in overturning doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is no federal general common law").
While the Swift doctrine was intended to create uniformity in substantive law throughout
the country, it "did not achieve complete or even near uniformity." 1A J. MooRE, MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.303, at 3035 (2d ed. 1982).
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Black, a member of the Erie Court, termed the decision
"one of the most important cases at law in American legal history." Address by Justice
Black, Missouri Bar Association Annual Banquet (Sept. 25, 1942), reprinted in 13 Mo. B.J.
173, 174 (1942). For a discussion of the rationale underlying the Erie decision and the
problems created by it, see Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40
Tsx. L. REv. 509 (1962); Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: II, 40
TEx. L. REv. 619 (1962).
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or by the decisional law of the state's highest, court.15 Erie sought
to ensure that the "outcome of the litigation in the federal court
[would] be substantially the same... as it would be if tried in a
state court."16 The Erie decision, however, failed to provide a
method by which the federal judiciary could determine the proper
state law to apply in the absence of definitive state
pronouncements.17
Faced with this dilemma, some federal courts attempted to
avoid the problem by abstaining from the exercise of properly in-
voked diversity jurisdiction."8 This practice was invalidated by the
,5 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Discontented with the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson and the forum shopping resulting from the disparity in "general law," 304
U.S. at 74-75, the Supreme Court, in Erie, seized the opportunity to render Swift "as dead
as that Court can kill a legal doctrine," Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE
L.J. 1336, 1337 (1938); see also 1A J. MooR, supra note 13, 0.304 (Erie overruled Swift v.
Tyson and its progeny).
Subsequently, Supreme Court cases have expanded the Erie rule to include decisions of
intermediate state appellate courts. See, e.g., Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464,
467 (1940); West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1940). The Supreme Court has gone so far
as to require that, absent a dispositive decision by the highest state court or intermediate
state appellate courts, the federal court in a diversity case is obligated to follow the decision
of a state trial court. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-79 (1940); see
infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. The requirement that federal courts follow deci-
sions of state courts has led one federal judge to comment that "[judges] must act as a
hollow sounding board, wooden indeed, for any state judge who cares to express himself."
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-91 (1946).
16 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The federal court is "in
effect, only another court of the State," id. at 108, and must apply that law, including the
conflict of laws rules, which would be applied by the state courts in the state in which the
federal court sits, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941); Griffin
v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941); see also Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423
U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (reaffirmance of the application of Klaxon in diversity cases).
17 Stimson, Swift v. Tyson-What Remains? What is (State) Law?, 24 CoRNELL L.Q.
54, 64 (1938). Since Erie, the problem of ascertaining and applying nonexistent state law has
presented a formidable obstacle to federal courts seeking to achieve the uniformity of law
mandated by Erie. See 1A J. MooRS, supra note 13, 0.307[1], at 3077; Note, The Ascer-
tainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity Case, 40 INn. L.J. 541, 541-42 (1965).
" See, e.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202, 207-08 (5th Cir.), rev'd,
320 U.S. 228 (1943); Morin v. City of Stuart, 111 F.2d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 1940). Historically,
the federal courts have recognized that there are situations where a federal court may de-
cline to exercise properly invoked jurisdiction. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 52, at 218. The
cases that have advocated this type of action fall under the collective doctrine of abstention.
However, there are actually four factual situations in which the abstention doctrine can be
applied. Id. The federal courts may abstain (1) to sidestep a federal constitutional question
if a decision can be rendered on questions of state law;, (2) to allow a state to handle its own
affairs thereby avoiding any federal-state conflict; (3) to allow the state to settle undecided
questions of state law; (4) to ease the heavy burden of cases on the federal court docket. Id.;
see 1A J. MooR, supra note 13, 0.203[1]-[4]. Use of the abstention doctrine to allow the
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Supreme Court's subsequent statement that in the absence of ex-
ceptional circumstances warranting abstention, a federal court has
a duty to decide a diversity case properly before it, regardless of
the difficulty involved in determining the applicable state law.' In
exercising this duty, however, federal courts initially based diver-
sity decisions upon their independent evaluations of the merits of
the case.2 0 In response, the Supreme Court provided additional
state to settle undecided questions of state law is the rationale frequently invoked by federal
courts seeking to avoid having to resolve such novel questions. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
11, § 52, at 224-25; Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward
Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 345 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification].
19 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). In Meredith, the Court stated:
[D]iversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to
serve their convenience. . . . In the absence of some recognized public policy or
defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred. . . it has from
the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is
properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the ren-
dition of a judgment.
Id. (citations omitted). Subsequent to Meredith, the Supreme Court succinctly stated,
"[t]he problem of ascertaining the state law may often be difficult. But that is not a suffi-
cient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case prop-
erly before it." Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 553 (1946). But see Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1959); Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1940). In Thibodaux, the Supreme Court
reinstated the district court's decision to abstain from deciding the case until after the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana had had an opportunity to authoritatively decide a novel question
of statutory interpretation. 360 U.S. at 30-31. In sanctioning the district court's abstention,
the Supreme Court made a point of distinguishing the case from Meredith. Id. at 27 n.2.
The Court noted that in Thibodaux the district court merely stayed disposition of a re-
tained case until that state judiciary resolved the issue, while in Meredith the lower court
sought to surrender altogether jurisdiction to the state court. Id. More recently, however,
the Supreme Court has interpreted Thibodaux as sanctioning abstention only in cases that
present "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar." Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
Although Thompson was decided prior to Meredith, the Meredith Court cited Thomp-
son with apparent approval, 320 U.S. at 236, and yet the sole reason for ordering abstention
in Thompson was the presence of a difficult question of undecided state law, 309 U.S. at
483-84. Because of the subsequent decision in Meredith, the application of Thompson gen-
erally has been restricted to bankruptcy cases. 1A J. MooRE, supra note 13, 0.203[3], at
2134. Despite the Supreme Court's demonstrated distaste for abstention, several federal
courts have continued to avoid the problems of deciding novel questions of state law. See,
e.g., United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delany, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 935 (1964); Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1962).
20 E.g., Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945) (in the absence of state law, a
federal court is "free to take the course which sound judgment demands"); Wigginton v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 126 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1942) (without
guidance from the state, federal courts are "bound to declare the law of the case"). But see
Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945).
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guidance for the federal judiciary by advancing the "prediction"
method,21 which demands nothing less than a valid ascertainment
of how the state court would decide the identical issue.22 Although
the prediction method provides some guidance to the federal
courts, it fails to delineate the procedures to be followed in making
an accurate prediction. Given the lack of a systematic course of
inquiry, the entire process of predicting unsettled questions of
state law continues to be a "hazardous occupation. '23
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.: NOVEL QUESTIONS OF STATE
LAW AND INTERCIRcuIT DEFERENCE
The problem of determining an unsettled question of state law
in a diversity case recently presented itself to the Second Circuit
21 See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961). Nolan appears to be
the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court advocated that federal courts at-
tempt to predict how the state court would resolve a novel issue of state law. See Note,
supra note 17, at 549-50. Prior to this decision, however, Justice Frankfurter, in a concur-
ring opinion, intimated that the method was appropriate, stating that "[a]s long as there is
diversity jurisdiction, 'estimates' are necessarily often all that federal courts can make in
ascertaining what the state court would rule to be its law." Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
Am., 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Nolan, the Court remanded
the case to the Second Circuit and instructed that it decide how the New York Court of
Appeals would ascertain California law in light of three possibly conflicting California cases.
365 U.S. at 295-96. The Court, in effect, required the Second Circuit to predict how New
York would apply California law. See Note, supra note 17, at 550.
22 Any attempt by a federal court to render an independent determination of the appli-
cable state standard predicated upon its opinion of what the law should be has been held to
be improper and contrary to the role of a federal court in a diversity case. See Glassman
Constr. Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 340, 342-43 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 987 (1966); see also Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345, 346.47 (9th
Cir. 1974) (only when there is no applicable state law does the federal court have the
"doubtful privilege of 'first guessing"' what the state courts might do); Costello v. Schmid-
lin, 404 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1968) (it is necessary for the federal court to determine what the
state's highest court would probably rule in a similar case). Indeed, federal courts have rec-
ognized that their task is to predict, rather than to formulate independently, state law. See
Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 350 F. Supp. 949, 951 (S.D.W. Va. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 538
(4th Cir. 1973); see also McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 240 (4th Cir.) (federal
court in diversity case is not free to fashion the state law to comport with its own prefer-
ences), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Kline v. Wheels By Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d 184, 187
(4th Cir. 1972) (federal court cannot fashion a rule that it considers best). A few courts,
however, continue to adhere to the principle that when there is no applicable state law, they
are free to exercise their own independent judgment in determining the appropriate law.
See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.) (federal court
may exercise its judgment based upon its own conceptions of sound and just rules), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
S Costello v. Schmidlin, 404 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1968).
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Court of Appeals in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 24 In enter-
ing this "phantom-law wonderland '25 the court chose a unique ap-
proach to the prediction method of determining the appropriate
state law by deferring to a prior prediction rendered by a sister
circuit.
The Factors case involved Elvis Presley and his assignment of
the right to exploit his name and likeness for commercial purposes
to Boxcar Enterprises, Inc., a Tennessee corporation formed by
Presley.26 After the singer's death, Boxcar granted Factors Etc.,
Inc. an exclusive license to use Presley's name and likeness in con-
nection with the manufacture and sale of merchandise.2 7 Subse-
quently, Pro Arts, Inc. published a memorial poster of Presley
without permission and offered it for retail sale.28 Seeking to enjoin
the manufacture, sale and distribution of the posters, Factors suc-
cessfully brought suit in the federal district court for the Southern
District of New York.2 9 Three years after the initial decision in the
case, the Second Circuit was asked to decide whether a descendible
right of publicity existed under Tennessee law.30 In the absence of
24 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982).
25 Stool v. J.C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1968).
28 652 F.2d at 279. The exact terms of the assignment from "the king of rock and roll"
to Boxcar were not clear. Id. at 279 n.2; Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1346-47 (D.N.J. 1981).
27 652 F.2d at 279. The licensing arrangement was entered into 2 days after Presley's
death. Id. The license specifically provided for quality control by Boxcar of the merchandise
manufactured and sold by Factors. 513 F. Supp. at 1347.
28 652 F.2d at 279. The poster displayed a photograph of Elvis and the dates 1945-1977.
Id. The copyright to the photograph previously had been purchased by Pro Arts from a
newspaper photographer. Id.
2" Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). The district court granted the
temporary injunction which prohibited Pro Arts from "manufacturing, distributing, selling
or by any other means profiting from souvenir merchandise bearing the name or likeness of
the late Elvis Presley until the merits of the case [were] determined." 444 F. Supp. at 292.
The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the issuance of the injunction and remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings. 579 F.2d at 222.
1o Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979). In affirming the lower court's issuance of the temporary injunction, the Second Cir-
cuit necessarily determined that, under Tennessee law, Elvis Presley's right of publicity sur-
vived his death. 579 F.2d at 220-22. The court remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings pursuant to Factor's request for a permanent injunction against Pro
Arts. Id. at 222. On remand, the district court agreed that Boxcar Enterprises, Inc. pos-
sessed a valid and transferrable right of publicity which survived Presley's death. Factors
Etc., Inc., 496 F. Supp. at 1104. Concluding that Pro Arts had no authorization from Boxcar
or Factors to manufacture and sell the poster of Presley, the district court permanently
enjoined Pro Arts. Id. Pro Arts subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit. See Factors
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any dispositive Tennessee decision, the circuit court was required
to predict the Tennessee court's future resolution of the question.31
The court sought the guidance of the Sixth Circuit, which previ-
ously had decided the descendibility issue in Memphis Develop-
ment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.32 There, the Sixth Circuit
determined that under Tennessee law Presley's right of publicity
did not survive his death. 33
Conceding that its approach to the problem was original,3 4 the
Second Circuit deferred as a matter of stare decisis to the Sixth
Circuit's prior determination of Tennessee law,35 and concluded
that no descendible right of publicity existed." Judge Newman,
writing for the Second Circuit panel 3 7 noted that the need to mini-
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982).
"1 See Factors Etc., Inc., 652 F.2d at 282; supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
'2 Factors, Etc., Inc., 652 F.2d at 281; see Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc.,
616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
" Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 960. Memphis Development, like Factors, also
concerned the manufacture and distribution of Elvis Presley memorabilia. In this case, the
Memphis Development Foundation, a nonprofit Tennessee corporation, commissioned an
artist to design and cast a bronze statue of Presley. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). The statue was to be erected in Memphis,
Tennessee, Presley's home town. Id. To offset the cost of the project, the Foundation sought
private contributions and, in an effort to encourage these contributions, offered an 8-inch
pewter replica of the statue to anyone contributing over $25. Id. The Foundation brought
suit to enjoin Factors' alleged interference with its solicitation of contributions, as well as its
distribution of the pewter statues. Id. at 1325. Maintaining that it owned the exclusive right
to manufacture and sell Presley memorabilia, Factors moved for a preliminary injunction
against the further distribution of the replicas by the Foundation. Id. at 1324-25. The dis-
trict court found that under Tennessee law there is a descendible right of publicity and that
Factors held exclusive control of this right pursuant to its agreement with Boxcar Enter-
prises. Id. at 1329-31. On this basis, the court granted the defendant's preliminary injunc-
tion enjoining the Foundation's further distribution of the statues. Id. at 1331. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit, relying on "certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy, in-
heritability and economic opportunity," concluded that under Tennessee law there was no
descendible right of publicity, 616 F.2d at 958, and reversed the earlier district court ruling,
id. at 960. For a discussion of Memphis Development, see infra notes 106-19 and accompa-
nying text.
" Factors Etc., Inc., 652 F.2d at 281. The court was "surprised" to find little mention
in appellate courts' opinions of intercircuit judicial deference. Id. The court noted that cir-
cuit courts frequently deferred to a district court's interpretation of state law, and that the
Supreme Court has, in the past, deferred to the circuit court's determination of state law.
Id. The court, however, was unable to find a case concerning the propriety of a circuit defer-
ring to a sister circuit's interpretation of state law for a state within that circuit. Id.
35 Id. at 283 & n.8.
16 Id. at 283.
'* The majority consisted of Judge Newman of the Second Circuit, and Judge Carter of
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, who was sitting by designation.
Judge Mansfield filed a dissenting opinion.
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mize deviation by federal courts from the normal course of state
law development justified the court's policy of intercircuit judicial
deference.3 8 The court concluded that any decision contrary to the
Sixth Circuit's determination would introduce needless confusion
into the law by engendering uncertainty as to the applicable prin-
ciples of Tennessee law.39 While implicitly recognizing that only
the "'pertinent court of appeals' -140 interpretation of state law
would be entitled to deference,41 the majority emphasized that
such an interpretation would not automatically be binding upon
the federal courts of all other circuits. 42 Judge Newman reasoned
that where the pertinent court of appeals has rendered its predic-
tion of undeclared state law, the other circuit courts of appeals
should defer to that prediction, "perhaps always, and at least in all
situations except the rare instance where it can be said with con-
viction that the pertinent court of appeals has disregarded clear
signals emanating from the state's highest court pointing toward a
different rule. '43 Finding no such evidence in the Sixth Circuit's
decision, the Second Circuit accepted the Memphis Development
decision as "controlling authority" on Tennessee law.44
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mansfield maintained that blind
deference to a decision with which the court disagrees is unwar-
' 652 F.2d at 282. The court concluded that a policy that recognizes a sister circuit's
interpretation of the law of a state within its territory as an authoritative exposition of that
law will serve the dual purpose of promoting the orderly development of state law and en-
suring fairness to persons subject to state law requirements. Id.
11 Id. at 282-83. Judge Newman posed the following question: if the Second Circuit
ignored the Sixth Circuit decision and determined that the law of Tennessee recognizes a
descendible right of publicity, what standard of conduct would guide Tennessee residents
wishing to know whether their right of publicity was transferrable to their estate or heirs
upon death? Id. The court noted that if the Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently ren-
dered a decision contrary to the Sixth Circuit's determination, the state court decision
would represent controlling authority on the applicable state standard. Id. at 282.
'0 See id. at 282. The Second Circuit referred to the circuit court that encompasses the
state whose law is to be interpreted as the "pertinent court of appeals." Id.
"1 Id. The opinion in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. deals almost entirely with the
deference owed to a circuit court of appeals that encompasses the state whose law is to be
interpreted. Id. at 282-83.
42 Id. at 283. The court reasoned that if the pertinent court's decision had been super-
seded by a subsequent enactment of the state legislature or a ruling by the state court,
another federal circuit court would not be required to defer to the decision of the pertinent
court of appeals. Id. Further, if the circuit court was persuaded that the pertinent court had





ranted."5 Noting that the reasoning of Memphis Development was
"inconsistent with that of nearly every other case which has con-
sidered the issue,""' the dissent argued that the Sixth Circuit made
no attempt to use the methodology generally employed by the
Tennessee courts in deciding a case of first impression. 7 Thus, the
dissent opined that the Sixth Circuit's decision was not entitled to
deference.4 8 Emphasizing that the "[s]oundness [of the decision]
must not be sacrificed on the altar of consistency,"' 9 the dissent
concluded that the Second Circuit should decide the case on the
merits rather than retreat behind "unsupportable deferential
niceties."50
Although the Factors approach provides a means of maximiz-
ing intercircuit uniformity in interpretation of state law, the proce-
dure suffers from a number of disadvantages. While the Factors
court clearly did not intend to promote the uniformity of "bad"
state law among the circuits, its practice of blind deference51 might
45 Id. at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that since a circuit court
typically does not defer to the decision of a sister circuit with which it disagrees, deference
was not warranted. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
46 Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield presented a comprehensive list of
cases upholding the validity of a descendible right of publicity as well as several articles
espousing the virtues of such a position. Id. at 284 nn.1-2 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
4" Id. at 285-86 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
49 Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained:
In the unusual situation ... where an initial court of appeals diversity decla-
ration is in no way derived from the law or practice of the state and interprets no
existing state law, . . . [the court] should feel free to reach a different result if
sound reasons recommend it, regardless of the unpersuasive views of the sister
circuit from which the initial declaration emanated.
Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
51 The Factors majority suggested only two instances in which the decision of the perti-
nent court of appeals would not be binding. First, where a state court subsequently rules
contrary to the federal court's decision, the federal decision is of no precedential value and
subsequent federal courts must follow the state court decision. Id. at 283; see IA J. MooRE,
supra note 13, 0.307[3], at 3100-01. Second, when the pertinent court has disregarded clear
signals emanating from the state's highest court, the reviewing court should not defer. 652
F.2d at 283. It is suggested, however, that this situation rarely will occur in actual practice.
If the highest state court has given a clear indication of its views on the matter before the
federal court, it is doubtful that these signals would escape the attentive eyes of counsel and
therefore unlikely that they would go unheeded by the circuit court.
Thus, it is submitted that the Second Circuit offered only one realistic situation in
which deference would not be required-a subsequent pronouncement by the state legal
authorities that is contrary to the pertinent court's determination. The Second Circuit's
policy more correctly may be classified as nearly blind deference and, as Judge Mansfield
noted in his dissent, the use of this policy to promote consistency in the law may require the
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well serve such an end. Moreover, a vicarious prediction of state
law by a reviewing court, based upon deference to a prior inaccu-
rate prediction of a sister circuit, runs afoul of the Erie mandate.5 2
It is submitted, therefore, that it is incumbent upon the deferring
circuit to examine closely the accuracy of a sister circuit's predic-
tion to ensure that it merits deference. In this context, "accuracy"
does not mean that the prior decision comports with the reviewing
court's resolution of the issue, but rather that it represents an ap-
propriate prediction of state law. It is necessary, therefore, to iden-
tify the critical elements of an accurate prediction.
A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERCIRCUIT DEFERENCE: PROPOSED INQUIRIES
The four inquiries proposed below are designed to establish a
set of standards by which a reviewing court can measure the accu-
racy of the pertinent court's prediction of state law prior to adopt-
ing that prediction as its own.
(1) The opportunity available to the reviewing court to certify
the unanswered question of state law to the highest court of the
state
Several states currently provide a statutory procedure by
which a federal court may certify an unanswered question of state
law to the highest court of the state.53 A byproduct of the absten-
tion doctrine,54 the certification procedure" allows a federal court
sacrifice of the soundness of the decision. 652 F.2d at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
52 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
53 States that presently permit certification include Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Ha-
waii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Washington. 1A J. MooRE, supra note 13, 0.203[5], at 2142 nn.1-2.
Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMi L. REV. 717, 718 (1969); see supra notes 18-19.
"I Certification is a procedural device that permits a court to refer a difficult question
of law to another court which is a higher authority on the matter or has some particular
expertise in dealing with matters of that nature. Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification,
supra note 18, at 348. There are two basic forms of certification-intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional. Id. Intrajurisdictional certification occurs between two courts within the
same court system. Id. at 348, 349 n.40. Interjurisdictional certification occurs when the
certifying court and answering court are members of two separate judicial systems. Nor-
mally, the latter form of certification arises when a federal court certifies a difficult question
of state law to the highest court in that particular state. Id. at 348.
Typically, those states which provide for interjurisdictional certification do so through
their constitution, statutes or court rules. 1A J. MooR, supra note 13, 1 0.203[5], at 2142.
However, a state court can only provide for certification through adoption of court rules if
the state constitution permits it to do so. Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of
Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 888, 897 n.71 (1971). For instance, the
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to elicit an authoritative answer to a particular question from the
state court s.5  The necessity for judicial deference is thus elimi-
nated.57 Likewise, where the pertinent court of appeals has failed
to take advantage of the certification procedure, the reviewing
court may do so, again obviating the need for deference.58 It is
jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals is constitutionally defined, and therefore it
could not adopt a court rule providing for certification. Id. Furthermore, several states limit
the extent of certification to the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, while
others permit a variety of outside courts to certify questions. 1A J. MooRE, supra note 13, 1
0.203[5], at 2142-43; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061(1) (West Supp. 1981) (an example
of a state certification statute). A federal court usually certifies a question by filing a certifi-
cation order with the highest state court. IA J. MooRE, supra note 13, 1 0.203. This order
contains the question of law to be answered and a statement of all the relevant facts per-
taining to the question certified. See, e.g., id. % 0.20315], at 2142-43.
" The purpose of the certification procedure is threefold. First, by certifying a difficult
question of unanswered state law, the federal court is able to achieve several of the objec-
tives of abstention without the resulting problems created by that doctrine. Note, Inter-
Jurisdictional Certification, supra note 18, at 362; see supra notes 18-19. Second, certifica-
tion provides for a more "cooperative judicial federalism" because deference to a state court
allows that court to make an independent determination of the state law issue. Note, Inter-
Jurisdictional Certification, supra note 18, at 350; see Mattis, supra note 54, at 724-25.
Finally, the procedure allows federal courts to obtain an authoritative exposition of state
law without the inherent inaccuracies present in the Erie-Nolan prediction formula. See
Mattis, supra note 54, at 723-24; supra note 21.
Because of its ability to achieve these purposes, certification has received the approval
of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363
U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (in enacting a certification procedure the Florida legislature exhibited
"rare foresight"). On several occasions the Supreme Court itself has used the certification
procedure to clarify unsettled questions of state law. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S.
249, 251-52 (1963) (per curiam); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136, 136-39 (1963)
(per curiam). The Supreme Court also has directed circuit courts of appeals to certify a
question of state law to the state court. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-
92 (1974) (case remanded to the Second Circuit with instructions to reconsider whether
certification should be used); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). In addi-
tion, several circuit courts of appeals have embraced the concept of certification. See, e.g.,
D'Ambra v. United States, 518 F.2d 275, 277 (1st Cir. 1975); Guillard v. Niagra Mach. &
Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20, 24-25 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Farmer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 539
F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (circuit court refused to certify where there was adequate state
law to render a decision). District courts also have had occasion to employ the innovative
certification procedure. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 600,
603-04 (D. Mass. 1974); Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1116 (D. Colo. 1973), afl'd,
523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975). But see Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 957-58 (D. Colo.
1975).
17 A federal court that certifies a question to the highest state court need not speculate
as to what the state law might be. The state court can provide an authoritative answer
which must be followed by the certifying court as well as all federal courts subsequently
presented with the issue. Lillich & Mundy, supra note 55, at 906-08; see Mattis, supra note
54, at 723-24.
" The Supreme Court has indicated that when there is an unsettled question of state
law before a federal court and certification is available, the federal court is not required to
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therefore submitted that an inquiry into the availability of a certi-
fication procedure should be the threshold inquiry pursued by a
reviewing court. Once a certification has removed the need for ju-
dicial deference, the remaining inquiries proposed below become
unnecessary.
(2) The extent to which the pertinent court of appeals followed
the same procedures employed by the state courts in deciding
questions of first impression
When deciding a novel question of state law, state courts typ-
ically follow an established series of procedures developed through
case law.5 9 Many states, for example, look to the law of a sister
state for guidance.60 If the sister state previously has decided the
novel question presented, or an analogous one, the state court may
"borrow" the foreign law and apply it to the pending case.6 1 Some
certify the question. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). The decision on
whether to certify a question to a state court "rests in the sound discretion of the federal
court." Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has endeavored to define the factors it con-
siders when exercising its discretion on whether to certify. Florida v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d
266, 274-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976). In Florida v. Exxon Corp., the court
stated:
The most important [factors] are the closeness of the question and the existence
of sufficient sources of state law-statutes, judicial decisions, attorney general's
opinions-to allow a principled rather than conjectural conclusion. But also to be
considered is the degree to which considerations of comity are relevant in light of
the particular issue and case to be decided. And we must also take into account
practical limitations of the certification process: significant delay and possible in-
ability to frame the issue so as to produce a helpful response on the part of the
state court.
526 F.2d at 274-75 (citations omitted).
Despite the advantages of the certification procedure, some concern exists regarding the
judicial economy of employing the process. See Mattis, supra note 54, at 725-27. But see
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (certification saves time, energy and re-
sources); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification, supra note 18, at 348 & n.49 (certification
enables the litigants to save time and expenses).
11 See First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 525 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir.
1976); A. FRANTZ, How COURTS DECIDE 84 (1968); C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 271; Note,
supra note 17, at 553.
60 A. FRANTZ, supra note 59, at 84-85; 1A J. MooRE, supra note 13, 0.30912], at 3121-
22; Note, supra note 17, at 553; Comment, The Problem Facing Federal Courts Where
State Precedents Are Lacking, 24 TEx. L. REV. 361, 363 (1946).
"' Delaware practice illustrates the concept of "borrowing" the law of a sister state.
When confronted with a case of first impression, the Delaware courts typically look to the
law of New York and Massachusetts. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76
F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
931 (1950). The fact that Delaware pays particular attention to Massachusetts law and re-
spects the law of New York apparently was so well known that the district court considered
it part of its "legal notice." 76 F. Supp. at 565. Delaware also looks to the law of New Jersey
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states have particular sister states to which they regularly turn for
guidance.6 2 Therefore, in rendering a prediction of state law, it is
desirable for a federal court to consider decisions of relevant sister
states on the particular question of law.13 In addition, state courts
frequently refer to authoritative legal sources-apposite federal de-
cisions,64 analogous federal and state decisions,65 restatements of
the law, 6 books, treatises67 and law review articles 6 -s for assis-
when faced with a question of first impression. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Waterhouse, 424 A.2d 675, 681-82 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 586 (Del. 1976).
11 See Yost v. Morrow, 262 F.2d 826, 828 n.3 (9th Cir. 1959). In Yost, Idaho conflict of
laws rules controlled the action. However, there were no Idaho conflict of laws cases dealing
with the particular cause of action presented to the federal court. Id. The court, therefore,
assumed that "an Idaho Court would look to the decisions of its sister state, Oregon." Id.
Accordingly, the court applied Oregon conflict of laws principles. Id. at 828.
'3 See Burgert v. Tietjens, 499 F.2d 1, 8 (10th Cir. 1974) (federal judge may look to laws
of other states in predicting state law); Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1973)
(federal court may turn to the law of other jurisdictions to guide its prediction), vacated,
416 U.S. 386 (1974); Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971) (where there was
no dispositive Michigan Supreme Court decision, it became incumbent upon the federal
court to make a prediction on the basis of state law and the law of other states); Note, supra
note 17, at 553-54 (if the state "customarily relied heavily on the law of a particular sister
state... the federal court should also rely heavily on [this source] of law").
Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1980); Cottonwood
Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36, 40 (10th Cir.) (quoting
1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8, at 40 (C. Wright ed.
1961)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); 1A J. MOORE, supra note 13, 1 0.309[2], at 3122.
65 See Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1980) (federal
court may consider other decisions of the state); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d
1304, 1307 (1st Cir. 1973) (federal court used analogous federal decisions to aid in interpre-
tation of a state statute); Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir.
1942) (court used the state court's approach to a similar problem); Comment, supra note 60,
at 363 ("federal court will take into consideration ... analogous decisions of the highest
state court upon the assumption that a state court would do likewise"). Analogous decisions
on a similar question of law provide a valuable source of material to courts seeking an an-
swer to an undecided question of state law. A. FRANTz, supra note 59, at 88. Moreover, "the
use of [analogous decisions] has been most instrumental in the growth and development of
the law in its efforts to keep itself abreast of changing conditions. . . ." Id. at 89.
66 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 285 (3d
Cir. 1980); Garrison v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 583 F.2d 258, 262 n.6 (6th Cir. 1978). Character-
ized as a "veritable quarry of common law material put in a modern setting," the various
Restatements have made a profound imprint on the common law. See A. FRANTz, supra
note 59, at 93. As such, the Restatements provide the federal courts with considerable evi-
dence of the law of the state. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Iowa 1960). But see
Gates v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 378 F.2d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1967) ("it cannot be said that the
Restatement represents the prevailing rules or the weight of authority. It has been rather
completely discredited . . . . "), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968). The weight that a fed-
eral court attaches to the views of the Restatements necessarily depends upon the weight
afforded this source by the courts of the particular state. Note, supra note 17, at 553. One
federal court, seeking to determine the weight attached to Restatements by the state court,
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tance in deciding questions of first impression. A federal court
seeking guidance in predicting the applicable state law should turn
to these sources, as well as the ideological approach to the law
taken by the state court.69
Failure by the pertinent court of appeals to ascertain and fol-
low the appropriate state court procedures may result in an inaccu-
rate prediction of state law that is not worthy of deference. ° It is
undertook an accounting of the number of cases in which the state court had cited to the
Restatements. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1942). Ob-
serving that on 68 occasions the state court had cited the Restatements and that 14 of these
were to the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, the federal court concluded that the state
would have adhered to the Restatement. Id.
11 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 285 (3d
Cir. 1980) (citing "scholarly treatises"); Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Defer-
ence to State Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419, 427 (1960).
Books and treatises may prove particularly helpful to a federal court groping for state law
because the authors often anticipate potential legal problems and provide suggested an-
swers. A. FRANTZ, supra note 59, at 92. Furthermore, these treatises often present the diver-
gent views of several jurisdictions as well as the author's preference for a particular view. Id.
at 93. Thus, the federal courts should consult these legal sources prior to rendering their
prediction of state law. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 262 F.2d at 285; A. FRANTZ,
supra note 59, at 92.
" Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Iowa 1960); McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708, 713 (W.D. Mo. 1949), appeal dismissed, 184 F.2d 671
(1950); C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 59, at 270-71. One author has suggested that before a
court makes use of a decision of a court from another state, it should determine whether the
decision has been commented on in a law review, and if it has, whether it has been appreci-
ated or has been deprecated A. FRANTZ, supra note 59, at 92-93.
69 The necessity of following the state court's ideological approach to the law is a func-
tion of a federal court's role as another state court in a diversity action. Under such a role,
the federal court is required to apply that law which a state court would apply if the matter
were before it. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text. Within the confines of this
requirement, it is incumbent upon the federal court to decide the case with the requisite
degree of conservatism or liberalism displayed by the state courts. See Note, supra note 17,
at 554. It is this requirement that prompted the federal district court in Massachusetts,
faced with a case of first impression, to conclude that in the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, "Itihe emphasis is on precedent and adherence to the older ways, not on creating
new causes of action or encouraging the use of novel judicial remedies that have sprung up
in less conservative communities." Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass.
1951).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used a similar approach in McClung v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973). There, the court
reasoned that because the West Virginia Supreme Court had adopted a restrictive approach
to the allowance of damages in analogous situations, it was unlikely that it would adopt a
more liberal approach if it were deciding the case before the federal court. Id.
16 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 285
(3d Cir. 1980) (in order to render an accurate prediction, the federal court should examine
all relevant sources of the appropriate state law). Professor Moore has concluded that "the
method for ascertaining state law becomes a vital element in the effectuation of the Erie
policy of uniformity" and that a significant departure from state court procedures, by a
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therefore incumbent upon the reviewing court to assure itself that
its sister circuit complied with state procedures. It must be borne
in mind, however, that any requirement that the reviewing court
concur with the substantive aspects of the sister circuit's decision
would undercut entirely the concept of judicial deference.71
(3) Whether the pertinent court of appeals has disregarded clear
signals emanating from the legal authorities of the state point-
ing toward a different rule
Creation of state law is not reserved to the state legislature or
the highest state court. Typically, the foundation for the future de-
velopment of state law is formed in the lower courts. Therefore, to
assist federal courts in predicting answers to novel state law ques-
tions, this inquiry proposes the mandatory consideration of clear
signals emanating not only from the highest state court,7 2 but also
from the lower courts of the state. There exists, however, some dis-
agreement as to the binding effect of lower state court decisions on
a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is
federal court, might result in a substantially different conclusion as to the appropriate state
law. 1A J. MOORE, supra note 13, 0.307[l], at 3077. Several federal cpurts have specifically
required that state court procedures be followed when predicting state law. First Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 525 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1976); see Krugh v. Miehle
Co., 503 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1974) (court must interpret statute as would the state
court); Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D.R.I. 1971) (must look to the
same legal authorities as state court); Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 293
F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (must look to all data which state court would look to);
see also Note, supra note 17, at 553. ("[t]he federal court should strive to duplicate ... the
judicial method of the state court").
7! If the reviewing court engages in an exhaustive examination of the substantive as-
pects of the pertinent court's decision in an effort to ensure that the decision comports with
its own, the need for deference is eliminated. If the examination reveals that the decision is
contrary to the opinion of the reviewing court, that court would not defer to a decision
which it felt was erroneous. If, however, the decision did comport with that of the reviewing
court, there would be no need for the court to defer, since the pertinent and reviewing court
would be in agreement.
72 See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1981).
7' In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court held that a federal
court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the state, whether it is declared
by the state legislature or the decisions of the state's highest court. Id. at 78. In the after-
math of this landmark decision, the federal courts in diversity cases continued to apply
"general law" when presented with a question on which there were no applicable statutes or
decisions by the highest state court. See, e.g., West v. AT&T, 108 F.2d 347, 350 (6th Cir.
1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521, 526 (3d
Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). To alleviate this confusion, the Supreme Court de-
cided a series of cases in which it outlined the effect which federal courts must give to lower
state court decisions. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940); Six Com-
panies v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940); West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223,
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recognized that a lower state court decision, by a judge well versed
in the procedures and practices of the state's highest court, pro-
vides a persuasive indicium of the applicable state law.7 4 Hence, it
is submitted that lower state court decisions should be afforded
great weight by federal courts, and failure to so weigh them may
detract from the validity of a federal court's prediction of state
law.
Similarly, state court decisions on analogous questions of law
236-37 (1940); Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 311 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1940). In West, the
Court stated:
Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judgment
upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.
311 U.S. at 237 (citations omitted).
The Fidelity Union case went even further when it declared that in the absence of
decisions by the state's highest court or intermediate courts, a federal court is required to
follow the decisions of a nisi prius state court. 311 U.S. at 178-89; see C. WRIGHT, supra
note 11, § 58, at 267-68. This strict requirement that federal courts adhere to the rulings of
state trial and intermediate courts has been characterized as "the excesses of 311 U.S."
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 383,
400 (1964). Subsequently, the Court began to soften its strict mandate. In King v. Order of
United Commercial 'ravelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948), the Court determined that be-
cause a federal court in a diversity case is in effect only another court of the state, it is not
required to adhere to state court decisions which would not be binding on any other state
court. Id. at 161. However, the Court was quick to note that its decision was not intended to
"promulgat[e] a general rule that federal courts need never abide by determinations of state
law by state trial courts." Id. at 162. It recognized that the rule of Fidelity Union may still
be applicable in other situations. Id.
7' The case of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) provides a
concise exposition on the effect of lower state court decisions. The court stated that "while
the decrees of 'lower state courts' should be 'attributed some weight . . . the decision [is]
not controlling. . . ' where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point. . . .
Thus, under some conditions, federal authority may not be found even by an intermediate
state appellate court ruling." Id. (quoting King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of
Am., 333 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1948) and citing West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 237 (1940)); see Penn-
sylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1981).
There exist today certain situations in which a federal court is not required to follow the
decisions of lower state courts. Under the proper circumstances, a federal court is free to
consider all the data which the highest court would consider if the novel question of state
law were before it. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 58, at 269. This view appears to comport
with the preferences of the legal commentators. See, e.g., id.; Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 510 (1954). Apparently, the Court's attempt
to remedy the confusion as to lower state court decisions that followed Erie and Fidelity
Union has met with some degree of success. See Garris v. Schwartz, 551 F.2d 156, 158 (7th
Cir. 1977); National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1977) ("an
intermediate appellate court holding is presumptive evidence, rather than an absolute pro-
nouncement, of state law"); Estate of Salter v. Commissioner, 545 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir.
1977); Kincaid Cotton Co. v. Kesey Bros., 504 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1974).
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often provide a strong indication of the state court's probable reso-
lution of the question in issue." State court dicta also may indicate
the court's predilection toward a particular rule of law.76 Such
dicta is typically not binding on a federal court, but it is persuasive
authority which should be considered by the court in reaching its
decision.
77
Since a valid prediction of state law requires an examination
of all relevant data produced by the judicial bodies of the state, a
prediction by a federal court that ignores potentially enlightening
information provided by the state may be misleading and not de-
serving of deference. This third inquiry should therefore be satis-
fied prior to affording deference to a sister circuit's decision.
(4) The pertinent court of appeals' level of expertise and fa-
miliarity with the law of the state in question
While the expertise of the members of a circuit court of ap-
peals panel is not and cannot be the dispositive factor in determin-
ing whether to defer, it can nevertheless play an important role in
the decision.7 Typically, it is the perceived expertise of a judicial
authority that qualifies it as a "higher authority" on the law of the
relevant state. While courts at times may attribute great impor-
tance to the perceived expertise of a legal authority,79 this percep-
7' See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 285
(3d Cir. 1980) (to make an accurate prediction of the applicable state law, the federal court
should examine related decisions of the state courts).
' See A. FRArTz, supra note 59, at 89.
77 City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1979); Estate of Gold-
stein v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 813, 816 (10th Cir. 1973); Priest v. American Smelting &
Ref. Co., 409 F.2d 1229, 1232 n.6 (9th Cir. 1969); Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d
400, 405 (5th Cir. 1968); see Note, supra note 17, at 553 (if state court would recognize its
own considered dicta then the federal court should also recognize it). At least one federal
judge was not pleased with the practice of using state court dicta to predict the undecided
state law. Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals commented:
[T]he most vehement invoking of [Erie] generally occurs in cases to which it is not
applicable at all, in cases where there are no state decisions directly in point on
the question involved but tortuous reasoning from dicta or cases not in point is
relied upon to support propositions that the courts of the state have never decided
and no court in any state is ever likely to decide.
Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35
A.B.A. J. 19, 83 (1949).
78 See Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1972) (expertise of the
judge should not be the sole reason for deferring, but may be an appropriate consideration
where the state law is unclear and ambiguous).
'" See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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tion may not be fully justified.80 It therefore is important to define
the attributes that serve to characterize a particular court as ex-
pert, and thus deserving of deference. It is submitted that through
application of the criteria outlined below, a reviewing court can as-
sess the relative expertise of the pertinent court of appeals in the
area of state law at issue.
The Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals have, on
occasion, adhered to the interpretation of state law rendered by
the district court sitting in that state."' It is suggested that an ex-
amination of the reasons advanced by these courts for their deci-
sions to defer will assist in defining the factors that serve to distin-
guish a particular judge or court as an "expert."
In deferring to a district court, the Supreme Court apparently
places primary emphasis upon the legal training and experience of
the district judge. For example, the Court has followed the district
court's interpretation of state law when the judge was "trained" in
the law of the state, 2 a member of the state's bar, 3 a practitioner
in the state prior to appointment to the bench, 4 or a judge of long
standing in the state 5 who is "familiar with the intricacies and
trends of local law and practice."8 6 To this list the courts of ap-
peals have added a judge's residence in the state whose law he
must interpret.8 7
Close scrutiny of this list reveals that in each case it is the
district court judge's familiarity with state law that is the determi-
native factor in a higher court's decision to defer. Accordingly, it is
suggested that familiarity with state law is an equally applicable
criterion to be employed by a reviewing court in gauging the exper-
tise of the panel members of the pertinent court of appeals. As the
Factors court observed, it is through continued contact with state
law that these judges acquaint themselves with the methods and
80 See supra note 5.
81 E.g., Steele v. General Mills, Inc., 329 U.S. 433, 439 (1947); MacGregor v. State Mut.
Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942) (per curiam); City of Burbank v. Nevada, 658
F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1981).
82 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (quoting Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941)).
8 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956).
, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); see C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 58, at
271.
"' MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 280 (1942) (per curiam).
88 Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 630 (1946) (quoting Huddleston
v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944)).
87 Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975).
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procedures of the state courts and the interpretations of state
law.88
The expertise of the pertinent court of appeals is not, how-
ever, the only factor to be considered in the deference decision.
The very subjectivity involved in measuring a court's expertise
makes it undesirable to base any decision to defer solely upon this
evaluation.89 Each of the other three proposed inquiries should be
pursued to ensure a correct decision on the propriety of deference.
Even an expert court of appeals is unlikely to render an accurate
prediction of the applicable state law if it falls to follow the proce-
dures of the state court." Therefore, the expertise factor functions
to buttress a deference decision which already is adequately sup-
ported on the basis of careful consideration of the other inquiries.9 1
It is submitted that pursuit of the foregoing inquiries will
serve to ensure the accuracy of the deference decision, thereby pro-
moting the uniformity of "good" state law within the federal judi-
cial system. Furthermore, the requisite inquiries are not, upon
close inspection, unduly burdensome. Indeed, two of the proposed
inquiries for judicial deference are essentially the same as those
required of any federal court which independently predicts state
law in a diversity case. In rendering such a prediction, a federal
court necessarily ascertains the state court procedures for answer-
ing questions of first impression92 and pays particular attention to
any clear signals emanating from the state's legal authorities.9 3 In
fact, the reviewing court's task in a deference situation may be eas-
ier, in that once the procedures and signals have been identified,
the court need only determine whether or not the pertinent court
followed the appropriate procedures and considered the proper le-
gal authorities.94 In contrast, a federal court making an indepen-
" See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 283 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting
that one of the Sixth Circuit's panel members was a member of the Tennessee bar), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982). But see 652 F.2d at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (a mere
quantitative analysis to determine familiarity is not sufficient).
" Although the pertinent court of appeals may be the recognized expert on state law
for a state within its territory, it may nevertheless neglect to follow the proper state court
procedures or ignore signals emanating from the state legal authorities, in which case its
expertise will not represent sufficient grounds for deference. See supra note 78 and accom-
panying text.
90 See supra note 89.
91 See infra text accompanying note 99.
9' See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
1- See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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dent prediction has the added burden of applying the procedures
and interpreting the various legal authorities. 5
Furthermore, any doubts which remain as to the burdensome
nature of the proposed inquiries should be of little concern, for the
accuracy of a decision should not be subrogated to the expediency
of a determination. While it is desirable to maintain an expeditious
system of justice, this should not be achieved at the expense of a
valid prediction of state law. Hence, it is suggested that the value
of the proposed inquiries in ensuring a correct decision outweighs
any perceived judicial burden and thus application of the inquiries
is preferable to a system of blind deference.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS INVOLVING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN DIVERSITY
CASES
The proposed inquiries cannot be embraced as a comprehen-
sive system for deciding diversity cases unless their usefulness is
retained in cases which vary circumstantially from the basic Fac-
tors model. Three hypothetical diversity situations which may re-
quire judicial deference are presented below. In each, an attempt is
made to evaluate whether adherence to the proposed inquiries con-
tinues to ensure the most accurate prediction of state law.
The first problematical situation arises when the pertinent
court of appeals follows the proper procedures of the state court
but misapplies the law. To illustrate: a novel question of Delaware
law is presented to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Del-
aware does not provide for certification of the question to the high-
est court in Delaware,9" thus, the Third Circuit must predict the
applicable state law. 7 In rendering its prediction the court does
not ignore any clear signals emanating from the state's legal au-
thorities. Further, the Third Circuit properly ascertains and em-
ploys the same procedures used by the Delaware courts when de-
ciding questions of first impression. These procedures include the
application of pertinent New Jersey law."" Subsequent to the
Third Circuit decision, the same question of Delaware law comes
9' The burden of applying state court procedures and interpreting legal authorities is
not present under the proposed inquiries; the deferring court is precluded from examining
the substance of the pertinent court's decision to ensure that it comports with its own. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 53.
'7 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 61.
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before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Facing the choice of
whether to defer to the Third Circuit or make an independent de-
cision, the Second Circuit engages in the inquiries proposed above.
The court concludes that although the Third Circuit properly fol-
lowed the Delaware court procedures, it misapplied the law of New
Jersey to the Delaware question. The Second Circuit is thus con-
fronted with the question of whether to defer to what it believes is
an incorrect decision by its sister circuit, or decide the issue based
upon its own interpretation of New Jersey law.
The resolution of this problem is found in the relationship be-
tween the second and fourth proposed inquiries. The second in-
quiry mandates that a reviewing court limit its examination to
whether the pertinent court of appeals employed the same proce-
dures as the state court.99 In matters of interpreting the law of
states within its territory, the pertinent court of appeals is the rec-
ognized expert, and the other circuits necessarily must yield to its
interpretation. Through continued application, training or prac-
tice, the Third Circuit has acquired a greater familiarity with New
Jersey law than have other circuit courts of appeals which deal in-
frequently with New Jersey law. Consequently, after assuring itself
that the Third Circuit has not ignored the possibility of certifica-
tion, has followed the proper state court procedures and has not
failed to consider any clear signals from the Delaware legal author-
ities, the Second Circuit must recognize the expertise of the Third
Circuit in matters of New Jersey law and defer to the Third Cir-
cuit's decision regardless of whether or not it agrees with the
decision.
The second illustration involves a pertinent court of appeals
which properly follows the state court procedures but in doing so
misinterprets and misapplies the law of a state within the review-
ing court's territory. For instance, the Third Circuit is called upon
to decide a novel question of Delaware law. Following Delaware
court procedures, the Third Circuit looks to New York and misap-
plies New York law. The identical question of Delaware law then
presents itself to the Second Circuit, which encompasses New
York. The question is whether the Second Circuit should defer to
the incorrect decision of the Third Circuit or make an independent
determination of the question of Delaware law based upon its own
understanding of New York law. This situation illustrates the one
"See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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exception to the limitation on substantive review embodied in the
second inquiry.100 When the pertinent court of appeals applies the
law of a state within the territory of the reviewing court of appeals,
then the reviewing court is the expert on that law' 01 and accord-
ingly is permitted to review the substantive aspects of the perti-
nent court's decision. This is the one situation, under the proposed
inquiries, in which there is no need for judicial deference. By re-
viewing the substantive aspects of the pertinent court's decision,
the reviewing court acquires sufficient knowledge to allow it to
render an independent decision on the issue, regardless of whether
it comports with the pertinent court's decision. 02
The third and most difficult hypothetical problem, which is
one step removed from the basic principle of intercircuit deference,
is illustrated by the following situation. Subsequent to its advocacy
of judicial deference in Factors, the Second Circuit is presented
with a novel question of Delaware law factually different from Fac-
tors. The Third Circuit has not yet considered the issue and be-
cause the Second Circuit is unable to certify the question to the
Delaware Supreme Court, it is required to decide the case.10 3
Thereafter, the same undecided question of Delaware law presents
itself to the Third Circuit. That court follows the Delaware proce-
dures by applying the law of New Jersey, and it decides the ques-
tion contrary to the decision of the Second Circuit. 0 4 Following
the Third Circuit's decision, the identical question of Delaware law
comes before the District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The question is whether the doctrine of stare decisis requires
the district court to apply the Second Circuit's determination of
the question presented or, pursuant to the principles of deference
set out in Factors, to defer to the Third Circuit's decision. The
concept of stare decisis can be interpreted to sanction either reso-
lution. If the district court concludes that Factors only intended to
advocate judicial deference when the pertinent court of appeals de-
100 See id.
101 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
102 There is no requirement that a circuit court of appeals defer to the decision of a
sister circuit. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Second Circuit's
function, mandated by Erie and its progeny, requires it to predict the applicable state law.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The court must follow the procedures of the
state court and examine the same sources the state court would examine in deciding a ques-
tion of first impression. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
os See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 8.
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cides the issue first, then the district court would follow the previ-
ous Second Circuit decision on the issue presented. Since in this
hypothetical, in contrast to the chronology in Factors, the Third
Circuit did not decide the issue until after the Second Circuit had
spoken, the district court would be justified in adhering to the Sec-
ond Circuit precedent. If, however, the district court reads Factors
to require judicial deference whenever there is a pertinent court of
appeals' decision available regardless of when it was rendered, it
would foresake the prior Second Circuit opinion and defer to the
Third Circuit decision. In this hypothetical, the Second Circuit was
forced to make an independent determination of the applicable
state law because the pertinent court of appeals had not yet con-
sidered the issue. However, once the Third Circuit subsequently
decides the issue, the alternate interpretation of Factors mandates
that the district court defer to this definitive pronouncement by
the pertinent court of appeals.
Both of the solutions presented above are consistent with the
concept of stare decisis and either one represents a viable alterna-
tive for a district court. It is suggested that a district court con-
fronted with this situation employ the inquiries proposed herein to
ascertain the validity of both the Second and Third Circuit deci-
sions. Once this determination has been made, the district court
should follow the more "accurate" prediction of state law. The dis-
trict court's selection of either prediction can be justified by refer-
ence to the alternate interpretations of Factors set out above. If
the Second Circuit's prediction is followed, the district court has
read Factors to require deference only when the pertinent court of
appeals has spoken first. By following the Third Circuit, the dis-
trict court necessarily construes Factors as advocating deference
whenever there is an existing state law prediction by the pertinent
court. Finally, should the district court determine that both the
Second and Third Circuit opinions represent "accurate" predic-
tions notwithstanding their contrary conclusions, the expertise cri-
terion necessitates that the district defer to the Third Circuit's ex-
pertise on matters of Delaware law.
Factors REVISITED
Analyzing the propriety of the Second Circuit's deference to
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development,10 5 in light of
115 Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
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the proposed inquiries, leads to a result contrary to that reached
by the Factors court. The first inquiry, requiring that the review-
ing court employ the certification procedure where such an option
is available, is satisfied. Since Tennessee has not established a pro-
cess by which a federal court can certify unanswered questions of
state law to the Tennessee Supreme Court,108 neither the Sixth
Circuit nor the Second Circuit had this option available.0 7
The second point of inquiry is whether the pertinent court fol-
lowed the procedures and methods employed by the state courts in
deciding questions of first impression. An examination of Tennes-
see's procedures indicates that in cases of first impression, the
court typically examines state decisions on analogous questions of
law,108 relevant decisions of other jurisdictions" and various sec-
ondary legal sources, including treatises and law review articles. 1 0
Close scrutiny of Memphis Development reveals that in predicting
Tennessee law, the Sixth Circuit clearly failed to follow these Ten-
nessee procedures. While the court initially pays lip-service to
right-of-publicity cases emanating from other jurisdictions,"' they
are summarily relegated to a footnote, with little analysis of their
merits or faults." 2 Such a cursory examination, it is submitted, is
nied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
100 See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 958; 1A J. MOORE, supra note 13, 1 0.20315],
at 2142-43.
1 7 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
108 E.g., State v. Staggs, 554 S.W.2d 620, 625 (Tenn. 1977); Farris v. State, 535 S.W.2d
608, 611-12 (Tenn. 1976); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Cliff Pettit Motors, Inc., 513 S.W.2d
785, 787 (Tenn. 1974), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 587 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1979).
109 E.g., Wimberly v. American Casualty Co. (CNA), 584 S.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Tenn.
1979); Bandy v. State, 575 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tenn. 1979); Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682,
685-86 (Tenn. 1977).
110 E.g., State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 213 & n.2 (Tenn. 1980) (law review); Bandy v.
State, 575 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1979) (treatise); Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682, 685-
87 (Tenn. 1977) (treatises); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Cliff Pettit Motors, Inc., 513 S.W.2d
785, 787 (Tenn. 1974), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 587 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1979).
m 616 F.2d at 958.
12 Id. at 958 n.2. The court briefly discussed the theory underlying the recent trend
toward allowing a person to pass his right of publicity on to his heirs or assigns, id. at 958,
and noted that recognition of a descendible right of publicity would achieve a dual purpose.
First, it would encourage effort and creativity if the person knew that his heirs would bene-
fit from the fruits of his efforts. Id. Second, it would allow the decedent and those with
whom he contracts to create a valuable capital asset. Id. The court's inquiry into the advan-




not sufficient to effect an accurate prediction of Tennessee law.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit maintained that it had no means
by which to assess the Tennessee court's predisposition on the is-
sue, and thus based its decision entirely upon "moral presupposi-
tions concerning death, privacy, inheritability and economic oppor-
tunity.""' 3 By its failure to ascertain and employ the applicable
Tennessee procedures, 1 4 the Sixth Circuit clearly did not act in
accordance with its role as another state court. Thus, it is submit-
ted that Memphis Development is not a valid prediction of the
Tennessee law, and does not merit deference.
An examination of the third inquiry, which requires a court to
consider clear signals emanating from the state legal authorities,
also exposes several defects inherent in the Sixth Circuit decision.
A signal which cannot be ignored under this inquiry is an analo-
gous state court decision. 5 Presently, several Tennessee decisions
exist which may be considered analogous to the question of
whether there is a descendible right of publicity.11 These decisions
113 Id. at 958. The court stated:
[S]ince the case is one of first impression, we are left to review the question in
light of practical and policy considerations, the treatment of other similar rights in
our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting interests of the parties, and
certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy, inheritability and eco-
nomic opportunity.
Id. at 959. The Sixth Circuit proceeded to engage in a discussion of the general psychologi-
cal principles that motivate a person to seek fame and stardom. The majority theorized that
the desire to achieve success in a chosen field, the desire to make other people happy, and
the desire to receive psychic and financial rewards were the real motivating factors behind
the need to achieve stardom. Id. at 958-59. From this, the court concluded that the "desire
to exploit fame for the commercial advantage of one's heirs is by contrast a weak principle
of motivation." Id. at 959.
114 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted that it was perfectly clear that the Memphis Development decision was not
grounded in any existent local law or methods. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) The Sixth
Circuit, in addition, failed to ascertain those states to which the Tennessee courts look for
assistance in determining questions of first impression. Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting) Judge
Mansfield concluded that the Sixth Circuit's familiarity with Tennessee law played no part
in its decision, making the Second Circuit equally well qualified to reach an independent
determination on the merits. Id. at 286. (Mansfield, J., dissenting)
11 See supra notes 65 & 70 and accompanying text.
" See Sanford-Day Ironworks v. Enterprise Foundry & Mach. Works, 130 Tenn. 669,
172 S.W. 537 (1915); Robinsons v. Robinsons, Inc., 9 Tenn. App. 103 (Ct. App. 1928). The
Sixth Circuit's failure to consider analogous state court decisions is compounded by the
Tennessee district court's examination of these analogous decisions in its well-reasoned
opinion. Memphis Dev. Found., 441 F. Supp. at 1330. Furthermore, subsequent to Factors
and Memphis Development, a Tennessee Chancery Court determined that there exists a
descendible right of publicity under Tennessee law. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2204, 2208 (Tenn. Ch. App. Oct. 2, 1981). In that case, the court analo-
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were instrumental in supporting the Tennessee district court's con-
clusion that a descendible right of publicity exists under Tennessee
law." 7 Despite the lower court's reliance on these signals from the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit failed to consider
these decisions when deciding Memphis Development," s an omis-
sion which necessarily detracts from the decision's validity as a
prediction of state law. Consequently, it can be argued that the
Second Circuit should not have deferred.
The final inquiry, concerning the expertise of the Sixth Circuit
panel members in Tennessee law, plays a relatively insignificant
role in the present evaluation of Factors and Memphis Develop-
ment. Although the Sixth Circuit represents a higher authority on
Tennessee law than the Second Circuit," 9 this expertise does not
obviate the need for accuracy in the pertinent court's decision. An
incorrect resolution by an "expert" circuit is no more entitled to
deference than an incorrect holding by a "nonexpert" circuit. Not-
withstanding the Sixth Circuit's expertise, the invalidity of its de-
cision as a prediction of Tennessee law makes it unnecessary and
undesirable for the Second Circuit to defer.
From the foregoing analysis of Factors and Memphis Develop-
ment, it is apparent that the Sixth Circuit neglected to adhere to
its role as another state court. This failure, resulting in an inaccu-
rate prediction of the applicable Tennessee law, would have justi-
fied the Second Circuit in foregoing judicial deference and reaching
gized the Tennessee Supreme Court decisions in Sanford and Robinsons to the case at bar
and concluded that Lester Flatt, the well-known bluegrass singer and guitarist, enjoyed a
descendible right of publicity. Id. at 2206-08. The Tennessee Chancery Court determined
that the Tennessee Supreme Court probably would enforce such a right when presented
with an appropriate case. Id. at 2205. The lower court also examined several decisions from
other jurisdictions as well as a law review article which advocated the acceptance of a de-
scendible right of publicity. Id.
'" Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Tenn.
1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 953 (1980).
18 It is interesting to note that despite the Sixth Circuit's demonstrated acceptance of
a district court's interpretation of state law, see Lee Shops, Inc. v. Schatten-Cypress Co.,
350 F.2d 12, 17 (6th Cir. 1965), the court in Memphis Development reversed the district
court's determination without discounting the reasoning behind the decision, 616 F.2d at
956-60; see infra note 119 and accompanying text. It is submitted that this is a further
indication that the Sixth Circuit's opinion was somewhat less than sound and should not
have been afforded deference by the Second Circuit.
"0 Under any of the tests employed to determine a court's expertise or familiarity with
a particular state's law, the Sixth Circuit emerges with a greater degree of expertise. See
supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. However, expertise alone is an insufficient reason
for affording deference to the decision of the pertinent court of appeals. Id.
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an independent determination on the merits. Analyzed under the
inquiries outlined above, the deference afforded the Memphis De-
velopment decision was unwarranted and the Factors decision was
incorrect.
CONCLUSION
Faced with the difficult task of predicting the answer to an
undecided question of state law, the Factors court made a vicari-
ous prediction of the applicable law through the use of intercircuit
judicial deference. As this Note has suggested, however, the policy
of "blind deference" advocated by the Second Circuit falls to en-
sure the accuracy of the prediction, as required by Erie and its
progeny. To rectify the shortcomings of such an approach, the in-
quiries proposed herein seek to provide a method for deferring to
the theoretically higher authority of the pertinent court of appeals,
while at the same time ensuring that the decision of that court
represents a valid prediction of the applicable state law. In this
manner, the federal judiciary will be aided in achieving the goals
envisioned by Erie and Factors-uniformity of "good" law, dis-
couragement of forum shopping, orderly development of state law
and elimination of the confusion surrounding the applicable stan-
dard of state law. Perhaps most important, a reviewing court, after
examining the procedural aspects of the pertinent court's decision,
is able to determine independently whether to defer to that deci-
sion. The federal courts can, thus, avoid merely mimicking the per-
tinent court of appeals while at the same time promoting accurate
predictions of state law in diversity cases.
Bruce D. Davis, Jr.
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